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A CASE ANALYSIS OF
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969*
HANNA J. CORTNER**
Policy adopted by the legislature is not self-executing. Administrators must apply policy to problems. In so doing they exercise
discretion as to how and to what extent their actions comply with
statutory provisions. The discretion exercised by administrators
varies from policy to policy. For any particular policy, the availability and use of discretion depend on internal agency factors and
external patterns of support and pressure. Because of these interactions in the administrative system during the implementation
process, actual policy impacts may differ significantly from the legislative articulation of objectives.' This essay summarizes a number of
factors that affect implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.2 The findings are synthesized from the
literature on NEPA that studies the statute's impact upon environmental decisions and the process of decisionmaking.
On the whole, federal agencies have reluctantly and incompletely
complied with NEPA's requirements. Barriers and restraints have discouraged the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Congress and private interest groups
from playing a significant role in policing agency implementation.
Yet a number of incentives have encouraged federal courts to assume
an aggressive role. But as the major tool for achieving the goals of
NEPA, establishing a national policy on the environment, and
reforming administrative decisionmaking in environmental management, judicial activism has serious limitations. This essay concludes
that the interaction of these institutional limitations accounts for the
gap between NEPA's statutory promise and its policy performance.
SECURING IMPLEMENTATION: AGENCY REACTIONS
Federal agency implementation of NEPA and response to the
*This is a revision of Lake Powel Research Project Bulletin #10 (May, 1975).
*"Research

Associate, Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona; Senior

Investigator, Lake Powell Research Project. Research for this article was supported by Grant
No. NSF GI 44081 to the Political Science Subproject of the Lake Powell Research Project

from the RANN Division of the National Science Foundation.
1. See, e.g., Pressman & Wildavsky, Implementation (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq. (1970).
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requirement in Section 102(2)(C) for environmental impact statements (EIS), has been reluctant and incomplete. Evidence contained
in General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, Congressional hearings,
and scholarly research supports this pessimistic conclusion about
NEPA's effectiveness during its first few years of existence.
At the request of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the GAO reviewed the efforts of seven agencies and concluded
that agency implementation was neither systematic nor uniform. The
EIS was not being utilized as an integral component of these agencies' decisionmaking processes. 3 The GAO also evaluated the adequacy of six selected EIS's and found insufficient attention to
environmental impacts and alternatives and to comments of reviewing agencies, which limited the usefulness of the EIS in agency
decisionmaking. 4
Review of EIS's by Leonard Ortolano and William Hill,' a study
team at the University of Colorado, 6 and Gordon A. Enk 7 substantiate the GAO findings. Impact statements, they found, were
generally inadequate, prepared as project justifications rather than
decisionmaking instruments, and prepared at a stage at which it was
difficult to modify or reverse plans. The Environmental Impact
Assessment Project of The Institute of Ecology (TIE) has discovered
serious and persistent problems in impact statements which limit
their usefulness for decisionmaking and planning.' Furthermore, H.
Paul Friesema and Paul Culhane found treatment of social impacts in
EIS's inadequate."
During Congressional hearings agencies have indicated their displeasure with the new demands made of them. The agencies argue
that NEPA's procedural mandates reduce their capacities to discharge
agency duties. While praising NEPA's goals and objectives, they
quickly point out areas in which compliance with NEPA require3. Comptroller General, Report on Improvements Needed in Federal Efforts to Imple-

ment the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (1972).
4. Comptroller General, Report on Adequacy of Selected Environmental Impact Statements Prepared Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (1972).
5. Ortolano & Hill, An Analysis of Environmental Statements of Corps of Engineers'

Water Projects (Technical Information Service 1972).
6. Kreith, Lack of Impact, 15 Environment 26-33 (1973); Kennedy & Hanshaw, The
Effectiveness of Impact Statements: The US EnvironmentalPolicy Act of1969, 37 Ekistics
19-22 (1974).
7. Enk, Beyond NEPA: Criteria for Environmental Impact Statement Review (Institute

on Man and Science 1973).
8. Statement of Malcolm Baldwin in Complying with NEPA: Practice, Problems and
Potential,29 Bus. Lawyer 1349-52 (1974).

9. Friesema & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 Nat. Res. J.

(1976).
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ments creates difficulties. They complain that NEPA procedures are
too costly, time-consuming, inflexible, cumbersome, and detailed.
Compliance, the agencies say, results in unreasonable and unnecessary delays. For the most part the agencies do not challenge the
innovative spirit of NEPA, just its procedural, mechanical guts contained in the action-forcing provisions of Section 102.1 o
A number of analysts have looked within the decisionmaking
process to explain why agency reluctance to implement NEPA could
have been expected. Steven Fishman contends that established
policies, procedures, programs, and philosophy limit agency responsiveness to any new environmental policy. NEPA demands innovation, creativity and adaptation, all of which involve the risk of
failure. Since failure threatens achievement of a basic administrative
goal-institutional survival-an agency will cling to the patterns which
have proven successful. Hence, the agency will praise NEPA's policy
goals, but the administrative response will be to exert the least effort
possible.' '
Richard Liroff also notes the importance of institutional survival
and organizational maintenance. He argues that in order to secure
organizational well-being, each agency establishes predictable
patterns of relationships with its clientele-a "negotiated environment.,"1 2 An agency will not willingly disrupt these basic institutional relationships; it prefers to reinforce and preserve its negotiated
environment.
The quest for institutional survival is also linked to an agency's
statutory mission, as that mission is defined by Congress. An agency
that successfully performs its mission can expect continuing and
expanding support for its services. NEPA asks agencies to criticize
their own programs and to suggest alternatives outside t! eir own
jurisdiction. It expects agencies to question the very missions that are
the basis for their existence. For this reason the chairman of the
Administrative Conference of the United States argues that agencies'
propensities to fulfill their missions will always prevail.' I While
NEPA may affect the details of a project, it is unlikely to reverse
project plans or result in major modifications of agency programs,
even though they cause environmental disruption.
10. See, e.g., Joint Hearings on the National Environmental Policy Act Before the Senate
Comm. on Public Works and the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1972).
11. Fishman, A Preliminary Assessment of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 1973 Urban L. Annual 209-41.
12. Lixoff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency Response to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 Loyola U. L. J. 29-33 (1972).
13. Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 397.
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Joseph Sax is also pessimistic about NEPA's ability to promote
environmentally innovative thinking. NEPA has failed, he says,
because behavioral "rules of the game" take precedence over NEPA's
procedural reforms. According to Sax, an agency's operational
responsibilities make it choose the solution which offers the most
certainty for Congressional funding. A politically sensitive agency
will also attempt to avoid alienating its friends and constituents. The
solution preferred by an agency will probably not be challenged by
staff, hired professional consultants, or sister agencies. These behavioral institutional patterns, concludes Sax, make it highly unlikely
that agency self-reform will occur.' 4
Structural characteristics of a bureaucratic institution also affect
agency implementation of NEPA. In his comparison of the water
resource development programs of the Corps of Engineers and the
Soil Conservation Service (SCS), Richard Andrews finds variances
attributable, in part, to internal differences in bureaucratic organization. The Corps, concludes Andrews, was initially more responsive to
NEPA than the SCS because
"it was a larger and more autonomous agency; because the broader
range of its activities permitted more flexibility to change priorities
without threat to its organizational survival; and because it builds
accommodate the
larger projects whose budgets can more easily
1
expense of additional environmental studies." 5
Deficient in these organizational resources, the SCS's adaptation was
more difficult and more restrained.
Helen Ingram 1 6 and Richard Liroff' " emphasize the importance
of an agency's communication system. Incremental decisionmaking
and a restricted communications system, the authors maintain,
enable decisionmakers to search for information which is consistent
with their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and goals, and to filter out
information which is not. The selective perception which incremental
decisionmaking reinforces also affects the processing of information.
It narrows the kinds and numbers of alternatives considered, and the
permissible range of choice. The ingredients necessary for the longrange, full option, rational decisionmaking that NEPA requires are
absent.
Both behavioral and structural institutional variables affect agency
14. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 Okla. L. Rev. 239-48 (1973).
15. Andrews, Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparisonand Implications, 16 Nat. Res.

J.301 (1976).
16. Ingram, Information Channels and Environmental Decision Making, 13 Nat. Res. J.

150-69 (1973).
17. Liroff, supra note 12, at 26-29.
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reactions to NEPA. In sum, these characteristics include the bureaucratic organization's constricted communications structure, its flow
and use of information, its basic quest for institutional survival, its
statutory mission and financial incentives to perform that mandate,
its negotiated accommodations with clientele groups, its support
from staff, consultants and sister agencies, and its capabilities in
terms of size, budget and staff competencies. Although these characteristics vary among agencies they usually work together to make the
agencies resistant to change.
SECURING IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF
EXTERNAL ACTORS AND ISSUES
Despite internal pressures discouraging agency implementation,
actors and issues in the agencies' external environment often affect
the scope and direction of agency implementation. To assure that
NEPA's policy objectives and decisionmaking reforms are implemented, Congressional oversight committees, the courts, CEQ, OMB,
and private interest groups might be expected to play a vigorous role.
Yet except for the courts, these political actors have not played
major roles in NEPA's implementation.
CEQ lacks statutory authority to force agency compliance and
inclination to forge an aggressive oversight role for itself. The Council
has been most effective in persuading agencies voluntarily to adopt
its guidelines and in reviewing environmental impact statements to
determine weaknesses in agency implementation procedures. However, CEQ's oversight role is limited because it does not have authority to veto actions of agencies or compel adoption of its
guidelines.' 18 It does not have sufficient staff to review EIS's., 9 It
has also been criticized for failing to devise objectives and guidelines
for developing impact assessment methods."
Unable to sanction
agencies for noncompliance, CEQ has relied upon environmental
litigants and the courts to accomplish what it could not.2' As the
courts have handed down stringent rules, CEQ has incorporated them
into its revised guidelines.
During NEPA's formulative stages, there were indications that
18. Liroff, The Council on Environmental Quality, 3 Environmental L. Rep. 50051-70
(1973); Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the National Environmental
Policy Act 12-13 (1973); Andrews, The Council on Environmental Quality: An Evaluation,
27 J. Soil & Water Conservation 8-11 (1972).
19. Miller, Four-Year Score on the Environment, 38 Progressive 24 (1974); Complying
with NEPA, supra note 8, at 1320.
20. Lapping, Environmental Impact Assessment Methodologies: A Critique 4 Environmental Affairs 124 (1975).
21. Liroff, supra note 18, at 50052.
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OMB would play an important role in securing agency compliance. It
was expected that OMB, through its legislative clearance authority,
would monitor agency compliance with NEPA's requirement that
EIS's be prepared for proposed legislation. However, OMB has not
made NEPA environmental clearance part of its general clearance
activities. Lacking OMB supervision, the agencies have had little
incentive to prepare EIS's for legislative proposals, and few lawsuits
have been filed to compel their preparation. As a consequence, very
few EIS's for legislative proposals have been filed. 2 2
Messages from Congressional oversight committees are conflicting.
One of the sponsors of NEPA, Representative John Dingell
(D-Mich.), chairman of the Fisheries and Wildlife Subcommittee of
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, is an ardent
supporter of NEPA. During oversight hearings in 1970 and 1972,
Dingell's subcommittee prodded the agencies to comply more fully
with NEPA and encouraged CEQ to do more to improve agency
procedures.2 The aggressiveness of Dingell and his subcommittee,
however, is not shared by other Congressional oversight committees.
Many of these committees have been more concerned about their
agencies' performance of their missions than about their compliance
with NEPA. During 1972, Congressional backlash against NEPA
became so severe that environmentalists formed an ad hoc "Save
NEPA" coalition to lobby against a spate of proposed NEPA amendments.2 Finding considerable support in Congress for less than full
NEPA compliance, the agencies are not responsive to the few Congressional voices which urge more vigorous implementation.
Differences in public opinion regarding environmental protection
also enable the agencies to relax their application of NEPA. In the
late 1960's the environmental crisis was a dominant public issue.
NEPA symbolized the belief that environmental quality was a public
problem requiring governmental action. Shortly after enactment of
NEPA the environmental crisis began to give way to the energy and
22. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It
Should Work, 4 Environmental L. Rep. 10003-07 (1974).
23. Hearings on the Administrationof the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine

and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); Report on the Administration of the National
Environmental Policy Act, H.R. Rep. No. 316, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on
the Administration of the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act-1972 Before Subcomm. on
Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
24. See generally Barfield, Exemptions from NEPA Requirements Sought for Nuclear
Plants, Pollution Permits, 4 Nat'l J. 1025-34 (1972); Gillete, NationalEnvironmentalPolicy
Act: Signs of Backlash Are Evident, 176 Science 30-33 (1972); Zeldin, Will Success Spoil
NEPA?, 74 Audubon 105-11 (1972).
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inflation crises. Modifications in environmental protection legislation, including NEPA, are more frequently and forcibly espoused as
necessary if future energy demands are to be met. Presidential
policies echo this sentiment. Energy and economic initiatives have
priority over the environmental quality mandates of NEPA. The
levels of support that NEPA's clientele (environmentally concerned
citizens and groups) have been able to muster are slowly eroding. In
this climate of changing public opinion, the agencies appear hopeful
of finding public acquiescence in, if not support for, their reluctance
to embrace environmental values and continued advancement of
projects which are environmentally disruptive.
Economically based and development-oriented interest groups
such as miners, farmers and ranchers, loggers, utilities, and business
groups have not been ardent supporters of NEPA. Many depend
upon the federal government for grants of money, contracts, permits
and licenses, which are "major federal actions" subject to NEPA's
scrutiny. These interest groups are the agencies' clientele and integral
components of the agencies' negotiated environment. They have
routine access to the agencies, which in turn often seek their help.
They exert considerable influence in agency decisionmaking, 2 I and
their opposition to NEPA contributes to and reinforces the agencies'
unhappiness with NEPA.
Environmentalists, on the other hand, are seldom part of the
negotiated environment of the agencies. Environmentalists often
articulate policy demands directly contrary to the agencies' missions,
and they sometimes advocate actions which threaten the agencies'
institutional survival. Administrators do not as a general rule seek
their counsel. Access is not routine.2 6 Unable to persuade decisionmakers to comply with NEPA, environmentalists litigate. In this
respect, environmentalists are like many other gruops that depend
upon the judicial process to pursue their policy interests because
they cannot attain their goals from elected political institutions or
the bureaucracy. To achieve their goals, they must resort to litiga25. For discussions of the access and influence of the large economic interest groups, see
Truman, The Governmental Process (1955); Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society

(1964).
26. A substantial body of literature also supports the conclusion that access for all
groups is not institutionalized and that not all groups are represented or exert influence in
the agencies' decisionmaking process. See, e.g., T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology,
Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (1969); Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign

People (1960). On the access difficulties of environmental groups, see Large, Is Anybody
Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmental Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 62-113;
H. Cortner, Disadvantaged Groups in an Energy-Environment Conflict: The Southwest
Power Controversy (Ph.D. dissertation, 1973).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

tion. 7 In the case of NEPA, the courts are using their authority to
protect and advance the interests of the environmentalists.
SECURING IMPLEMENTATION: FACTORS ENCOURAGING
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Several factors have encouraged the courts to take a leading role in
implementing NEPA. The first is the ambiguous, indeterminate language of the act. NEPA's provisions are general and vague. Uncertainties in statutory language usually present many litigable issues, and
NEPA has more than its share of indefinite language.
To resolve statutory construction disputes, the courts use two
rules of decision." The first approach, "argument via plain meaning," focuses on the literal meaning of the statute. The second,
"argument via legislative history," looks behind the words of the
statute to determine what its framers meant. In NEPA's case the
"plain meaning" of the Act is not readily apparent; the first
approach offers little assistance.
The legislative history approach is not much more helpful. NEPA
passed Congress without accumulating the extensive legislative record
one would expect for such an important piece of legislation. One of
two Senate staff members who drafted the initial version of Section
102, Daniel Dreyfus, noted that "there wasn't much wrangling in the
[conference] committee" over the language of Section 102, and
although the staff attempted to generate public interest in the provisions, there was a "gross lack of appreciation for the significance of
that language." He expected the EIS's to be "brief, general statements averaging about two pages in length."2 9 Floor debate in each
house on the conference report was minimal, and the report was
passed by a simple voice vote. Most importantly, little was said about
how NEPA's action-forcing provisions were to be enforced. The
paucity and inconclusiveness of data on Congressional intent and
enforcement expectations is a second factor which encourages the
courts to interpret NEPA freely.
Unassisted and unrestrained by NEPA's language and history, the
courts have considerable latitude to interpret the Act. However,
judicial discretion can operate to restrict a statute's impact: courts
can refuse to recognize justiciable issues, they can throw problems
back to administrative agencies for resolution, or they can narrowly
27. R. Cortner, The Apportionment Cases (1972).
28. The two approaches are described in Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court

Decision Making 54-56 (1972).
29. Barfield & Corrigan, White House Seeks to Restrict Scope of Environment Law, 4

Nat'l J. 338, 340 (1972).

April 19761

CASE A NAL YSIS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

construe the statute. They have rejected these options in interpreting
NEPA, choosing to play an agressive role by entertaining challenges
to agency interpretation of the statute and recognizing that the
statute imposes many judicially enforceable procedural duties.
According to Frederick Anderson, the "courts' leading role in requiring compliance with NEPA may be traced in large measure to their
current willingness to review all agency action more closely than they
did only a few years ago."30 Judicial receptivity to NEPA can be
viewed as part of a general evolutionary trend in judicial decisionmaking. By accepting NEPA cases and reviewing agency action
regarding NEPA, courts are not engaging in unprecedented behavior.
This expanding role of the courts is a third factor which enables
them to assume an active role in NEPA implementation.
Fourth, NEPA itself expands the courts' scope of review of agency
behavior. The foremost authority on administrative law, Kenneth
Culp Davis, summarizes the changes.
NEPA calls into play many basic principles of administrative law. It
does not break or bend any of them but, like a magnet, it applies a
new force. NEPA teaches a good lesson about delegation. It seems to
make reviewable some action that would be unreviewable without
NEPA. It introduces an unfamiliar problem about the scope of
review. Some administrative action that has never been subject to a
requirement of a statement of findings and reasons is pulled into
that requirement, and some information must be disclosed under
NEPA that is exempt from required disclosure under the Information Act. NEPA provides new testing for emerging ideas about fair
informal procedure and for the most difficult portion of the
problem of requirement of opportunity to be heard. 3
NEPA goes beyond the traditional rules of administrative law which
govern judicial review of agency decisionmaking. To this extent
"administrative law under NEPA often differs from administrative
law without NEPA. ' '3 2 These more expansive rules for judicial
review increase the number of points of entry for litigants to challenge agency actions in court.
Finally, courts cannot unilaterally seek to implement the law;
cases and constroversies must be brought to the courts. Individuals
and groups must be willing and have sufficient resources to engage in
litigation. NEPA does not lack litigants who seek to enforce it.
Because of agency unresponsiveness, environmentalists have been
compelled to pursue their policy goals in the courts. According to
30. Anderson, supra note 18, at 15.
31. K. Davis, Administrative Law: Cases-Text-Problems 587 (1973).
32. Id., at xiii.
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Werner Grunbaum, they have been successful 50 per cent of the time
in the district courts and 45 per cent of the time on appeal. 3 Their
success breeds more litigation. When the threat of suit does not gain
agency compliance or when compliance with a previous ruling is less
than desired, environmentalists may return to court. Even if the
litigation process only succeeds in delaying a proposed project, the
environmentalists have scored a partial victory. Delay forces officials
to take a closer look at the environmental ramifications of the proposed federal action. Thus, judicial activism in implementing NEPA
gives environmentalists increased access to and influence over administrative decisionmaking.
In summary, an ambiguous statute which invites litigation, a
scanty legislative history, the general tendency of the courts to
expand judicial review, the administrative law-expanding character of
NEPA, and a constant supply of litigants combine to create an
atmosphere conducive to judicial activism in implementation of
NEPA.
THE INFLUENCE AND RESULTS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The influence and results of judicial activism can be seen in a
number of areas. Because most litigation has focused on the EIS
requirement, courts have played an important role in EIS formulation and review. The courts have been called upon to resolve issues
surrounding the applicability of the EIS requirement, and once
applicability is determined, issues surrounding preparation of the
statement. These issues include: (1) whether a "major federal action"
is involved; (2) whether the action will "significantly affect" the
environment; (3) which agency should file the EIS; (4) when the
statement must be filed; (5) who must prepare the statement; and (6)
what the statement must contain.' 4 Judicial decisions on these questions have made the courts important promulgators of guidelines and
criteria for EIS preparation and review.
To date, the most important impact of judicial activity has been to
force compliance with NEPA's procedural provisions. A long-standing rule of judicial review is that review is foreclosed when "agency
33. Grunbaum, Judicial Attitudes Toward Environmental Quality in the Federal and
State Courts (unpublished paper, 1974); see the similar data compiled by Wichelman,
Federal Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Toward
a Framework for Explaining Differential Response (unpublished paper, March 1975).
34. Seeley, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Guideline for Compliance, 26
Vand. L. Rev. 295-325 (1973). Seealso Anderson, supra note 18; Yarrington, The National
Environmental Policy Act, 4 Environmental Rep., 17 (monograph 1974); Deutsch, The
National Environmental Policy Act's First Five Years, 4 Environmental Affairs 3-80 (1975).
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action is committed to agency discretion by law." 3 Consequently,
courts are reluctant to rule on the merits of an agency's decision. The
courts tend to focus instead on whether a decision was made in
accordance with procedures prescribed by law. Courts seldom challenge the substance of the decision if it is made in accordance with
prescribed procedures. However, several courts have moved beyond
recognition of procedural duties to declare that NEPA establishes
judicially enforceable substantive rights. Yet on the whole, the courts
have shied away from substantive review of, agency decisions in
NEPA cases.' 6
Though judicial review generally does not reach to the substance
of decisions, agencies have still cancelled or modified project plans in
response to NEPA.3 7 Allan Wichelman links the agencies' compliance with NEPA's procedural mechanisms to substantive changes
within the agencies. He contends that the agencies' procedural
response has triggered a variety of learning processes which facilitate
agency adaptation to a new, internal environmental analysis structure
and facilitate substantive modifications in agency attitudes and
behavior. NEPA values, maintains Wichelman, are being integrated,
albeit incrementally, into agency planning and decisionmaking. 3 8
NEPA has created new points of access to agency decisionmaking
for environmental groups and citizens. These access points have given
the groups greater opportunity to be heard, to acquire information
about proposed projects, and to obtain review of agency decisionmaking. Friesema and Culhane argue that participation in the EIS
commenting process and in litigation can be and has been used to
increase the environmental sensitivities of decisionmakers and to
force environmental accountability upon the agencies. 3 9 In short,
asserts Liroff, through litigation and the threat of litigation, "ecology
groups 4have become significant actors in the agencies' environments." 0
The courts have given NEPA and its principal action-forcing provi35. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1946).
36. For discussion of judicial recognition of substantive rights see, e.g., Arnold, The
Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act,
3 Environmental L. Rep. 50028-43 (1973); Yarrington, Judicial Review of the Substantive
Agency Decisions: A Second Generationof Cases Under the NationalEnvironmental Policy
Act, 19 S.D. L. Rev. 279-94 (1974); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to
SubstantiveReview UnderNEPA, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 735-758 (1975).
37. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1973, at 246-47 (1973);
Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1974, at 377-81 (1974).

38. Wichelman, supra note 32.
39. Friesema & Culhane, supra note 9. See also Friesema, Environmental Group Fragmentationand Administrative Decision-Making (unpublished paper, April 1975).
40. Liroff, supra note 12, at 36.
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sions meaning, sustenance, and vitality. Judicial interpretation has
made NEPA more than a vague and insignificant policy declaration.
Courts have said whether NEPA applies and if so, when. They have
also played the dominant role in enforcing compliance with the EIS
requirement. They have formulated criteria for EIS preparation and
evaluated the adequacy of completed statements. Whether the effect
of judicial review is limited to procedural matters or whether it
extends to assuring implementation of NEPA's substantive policy
goals has been debated, and some support has been found for the
latter position. Fear of being enjoined has compelled the agencies to
implement NEPA. Evidence is emerging that NEPA values are
gradually being integrated into agency decisionmaking and that
environmental groups are assuming more salient roles in agency
activities. Hence, it is not surprising that many associate NEPA and
Section 102 successes with the successes of litigation. Throughout
NEPA literature the conclusion is pronounced; to the extent implementation of NEPA requirements has been achieved, judicial activity
has been the primary catalyst of change. Judicial policymaking has
extended NEPA's meaning "beyond anybody's wildest dreams. '
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS THE PRIMARY
INSTRUMENT FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Courts have serious disabilities for serving as the primary agent for
implementing NEPA. First, courts can be overruled by Congress 2
and lower federal courts can be overruled by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has heard relatively few NEPA cases, and has yet to
construe NEPA in any significant way. Yet the possibility exists that
a whole line of lower court decisions could be overruled or severely
modified by Supreme Court action.
Moreover, lower courts can overrule themselves. Courts are sensitive to the political climate in which they operate. While in the short
run they may render decisions counter to the prevailing political
climate, in the long run their policies reflect the opinions of the
lawmaking majority.' 3 Mounting criticism of judicial interpretations
and growing discontent in the legislative and executive branches with
the results of NEPA requirements may signal the courts to begin to
modify or reverse prior decisions.
41. Statement of Daniel Dreyfus, in Barfield & Corrigan, supra note 29, at 340.
42. Many amendments have been introduced which, if enacted, would have directly or
implicitly amended NEPA. While a few exemptions have been made, NEPA has to date
generally withstood efforts to amend it.
43. Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process 116-17

(1969).
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Second, administrative agencies soon accommodate themselves to
the courts. As Martin Shapiro notes, agencies are adept in "cultivating consensus by throwing issues up to the courts in forms and
degrees that will elicit judicial approval or at least acquiescence. In
short, the agencies know what will play in court and what won't."' I
There is no reason to expect that agencies are not learning the rules
of the game and will soon know which impact statements and agency
procedures will be acceptable to a court and which will not. Agencies
will learn not to press claims which disturb the traditional harmonious relationship described by Shapiro that exists between
administrative agencies and the courts.
Third, the procedural rules governing access to the courts function
more to the advantage of the agencies than to environmental
litigants. According to Donald Large, administrative unresponsiveness
to environmental claims, combined with restrictions on the use of
courts before, during and after the administrative process form a
closed system of law. Threshold technicalities consume much of the
attention of the courts, and if an agency can win just one of the
skirmishes over procedural issues, the case is dismissed.' I
Finally, judicial attitudes and behavior operate to protect commercial, industrial, and agency interests. Grunbaum's data show that
judges tend to view environmental problems within an economic
framework and to support agencies that are defending their projects
against the assaults of environmentalists. 4 6 These economic and
agency proclivities put individuals and environmental groups at a
disadvantage even in the courtroom when they try to press environmental claims.
While the foregoing factors pose potential threats to NEPA's
implementation, two limitations of judicial activism are already
manifest. First, judicial activism has overproceduralized' NEPA.
Agency reaction to judicial rebuke has been to add more paper to the
EIS. A longer, data-crammed statement, the agencies are finding, can
meet the judicial tests for adequacy. As the EIS drowns in a sea of
minutiae, its usefulness as a public information document diminishes.
Individuals and citizen groups lack the time and resources adequately
to digest or review a multi-volumed EIS. Major issues can thus be
more easily obscured.
Judicial emphasis on procedure has also made agency identification and evaluation of environmental impacts a discrete process
associated with the EIS. It has encouraged the agencies to view the
44. M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies 267 (1968).
45. Large, supra note 26.
46. Grunbaum, supra note 32.
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impact statement as a court exhibit. The statement must convince a
court that environmental factors have been considered by the agency
and that environmental consequences have been fully disclosed.' '
Some scholars maintain that if identification and evaluation of environmental consequences are to be truly effective, environmental
assessment must be interwoven throughout the entire planning
process.' 8 Yet as long as courts focus upon assessment as it is presented in the impact statement, agencies are unlikely to feel compelled to perceive assessment techniques and data as integral parts of
agency policymaking. The EIS's will continue to serve as project
justifications. Candid discussions of alternatives and thorough
delineations of social, as well as physical, impacts will not be presented. NEPA will continue to have only a limited impact at the
policymaking level. 9
Second, judicial activism is limited to procedural implementation.
Because judicial activism does not extend to NEPA's substantive
policy, court-ordered implementation is incomplete implementation.
While substantive change may occur as a result of formal compliance
with procedures, new procedures and rules do not necessarily change
attitudes or behavior if basic agency decisions can remain the same.
Sax labels the "emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural
reform ... nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.""0 The
ultimate success of NEPA rests upon implementation and acceptance
of its substantive environmental goals and objectives. NEPA must
affect change in the agencies' programs and policies; decisions and
policies must be made with a view toward creating and maintaining a
better environment. Yet it is in the area of substantive implementation and review of decisions that the courts generally practice judicial
restraint.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of policy is mainly a function performed by
administrators. However, other political actors-legislators, private
interest groups, the President, and judges-may be involved. This
47. Turner Smith discusses the strategy of corporate lawyers in preparing EIS's in

Complying with NEPA, supra note 8, at 1329-40.
48. Andrews, A Philosophy of Environmental Impact Assessment, 28 J. Soil & Water
Conservation 197 (1973); Flamm, A Philosophy of Environmental Impact Assessment:
Toward Choice Among Alternatives, 28 J.Soil & Water Conservation 201 (1973); Jordan, A
Philosophy Of Environmental Impact Assessment: Some Considerationsfor Implementation, 28 J. Soil & Water Conservation 205 (1973); Comment, The NationalEnvironmental
Policy Act Applied to Policy Level Decisionmaking, 3 Ecology L. Q. 799-842 (1973).
49. Strohbehn, NEPA 'sImpact on FederalDecisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance
and Suggestionsfor Change, 4 Ecology L. Q. 93-108 (1974); Wichelman, supra note 32.
50. Sax, supra note 14, at 239.
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paper has focused upon the interactions of these political actors in
the implementation of a single statute-NEPA.
When a new policy does not demand changes in the agencies'
established structural and behavioral characteristics, implementation
is apt to be facilitated. NEPA, however, demands change. It requires
modifications in a number of variables which are rooted in the
organization's basic structure and its established patterns of action.
To implement NEPA effectively, agencies would have to become
committed to innovative behavior and would have to make alterations in their internal value configurations. Such behavior is too risky
for the agencies; resistance and opposition have been the safer
course.
Originators of policy usually have a stake in realizing articulated
policy goals. Since NEPA's was initiated by Congress, Congress could
be expected to play a strong oversight role. However, NEPA's Congressional support quickly dissipated as court decisions showed the
legislators the significance of the language they had approved. Congressional pressures for improvements in agency implementation
efforts have been counteracted by Congressional acquiescence to,
and approbation of, less than full agency compliance. The agencies
also have little fear that retaliation for noncompliance will come
from CEQ, OMB or the President. CEQ lacks staff and enforcement
authority. OMB has chosen not to use its legislative clearance responsibilities to require agencies to submit EIS's for legislative proposals.
Finally, Presidential policy priorities increasingly place energy and
economic considerations above environmental considerations.
Agency propensity not to push NEPA's implementation has been
curtailed by the courts. As a result of court decisions there are discernable changes within agencies in response to NEPA and its EIS
requirement. There are, however, serious limitations associated with
judicial activism when it functions as the dominant external force
directing implementation. In NEPA's case overemphasis on procedure has caused the agencies to become chiefly concerned with the
preparation of judicially adequate EIS's. The merits of the impact
statement and its utility as a planning and decision tool have been
lesser considerations.
Judicial restraint in the area of substantive implementation and an
absence of pressures from other political actors have given administrators a great deal of discretion in substantive implementation of
NEPA. Agencies have exercised this discretion to avoid comprehensive substantive reform in agency decisionmaking and in decision
outcomes at the policy level. Consequently, after five years, NEPA as
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a vehicle for creating and maintaining environmental integrity and
reforming the process of environmental decisionmaking has had only
a modicum of success.

